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One-Man Corporate Entity in Torts
James A. Thomas*
T HIS ARTICLE IS CONFINED to a summary of the liability of a
sole shareowner for the torts of his employees or of himself
in the execution of the corporate business."
In ascertaining the tort liability of the owner of a one-man
corporation, the first step is to determine whether or not the
jurisdiction in question recognizes one-man corporations. For
even though throughout most of the United States today corpo-
rations in which one person owns all of the stock, directly or
indirectly, are prevalent, only three states specifically by statute
provide for one-man corporations. 2 Of the remaining states,
many have judicially recognized one-man corporations,3 others
have not ruled on the matter, and a few have specifically refused
to recognize the validity of the one-man corporation.4
A good example of what could happen in a jurisdiction that
has not ruled on the validity of a one-man corporation occurred
recently in North Carolina. The North Carolina Supreme Court
refused to recognize this device and held that when all of the
stock of a corporation is acquired by one individual, the corpo-
ration ceases to exist.5 The court had given no earlier reason
* B.A., Baldwin-Wallace College; Fourth-year student at Cleveland-
Marshall Law School.
1 For a more comprehensive treatment of one-man corporations and close
corporations, see: 1 Oleck, Modem Corporation Law, § 177 et seq. (1958);
O'Neal, Close Corporations, § 105 et passim (1958); Fuller, The Incorporated
Individual: A Study of the One-Man Corporation, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1373
(1938); Ballantine, Corporations, § 129 (rev. ed. 1946); Cataldo, Limited
Liability With One-Man Companies and Subsidiary Corporations, 18 Law
& Contemp. Prop., 473 (1953).
2 Wis. Stat. (1953) § 180.44; Code of Iowa (1954), § 491.2; Mich. Genl. Corp.
Act § 3, as amended by L. 1949, Act 229.
3 Garvin v. Matthews, 193 Wash. 152, 74 P. 2d 990 (1938); Keokuk Electric
R & Power Co. v. Weisman, 146 Ia. 679, 126 N. W. 60 (1910); Webber v.
Knox, 97 F. 2d 921 (8 Cir. 1938); Norins Realty Co. v. Consolidated Abstract
& Title Guaranty Co., 80 Cal. App. 2d 879, 182 P. 2d 593 (1947); State v.
Miner, 233 Mo. 312, 135 S. W. 483 (1911); Donovan v. Purtell, 216 fli. 629,
75 N. E. 334 (1905); United Banking & Trust Co. v. Russel, 38 Ohio App. 275,
176 N. E. 166 (1931). This list is not intended to include all states that have
recognized one-man corporations.
4 Louisville Banking Co. v. Eisenman, 94 Ky. 83, 21 S. W. 531 (1893); Geo.
T. Stagg Co. v. Taylor, 95 Ky. 651, 27 S. W. 247 (1894); Swift v. Smith, 65
Md. 428, 5 A. 534 (1886); First Nat. Bank v. Winchester, 119 Ala. 168, 24 S.
351 (1898).
5 Park Terrace, Inc. v. Phoenix Indemnity Co., 241 N. C. 473, 85 S. E. 2d
677 (1955); on rehearing, 243 N. C. 595, 91 S. E. 2d 584 (1956).
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to anticipate such a decision.6 The decision created quite an
uproar, for there were thousands of such corporations in the
state at the time. Immediately thereafter, the legislature
amended the law so as to provide for one-man corporations. The
court refused to retreat, and on a case whose facts occurred prior
to the amendment but which was tried after the amendment, the
court again refused to recognize a one-man corporation.7
The North Carolina incident stands as a bleak reminder of
what can happen in states in which there is no express judicial
or legislative sanction of the one-man corporation.
Tort Liability of Owner for Unintentional Torts of His Employees
In states which recognize the one-man corporation, it is
generally agreed that an individual may incorporate his business
for the sole purpose of escaping individual liability for the debts
of the corporation.8 This insulation is predicated on the separate
entity concept, whereby the corporation is treated as a legal
entity separate and distinct in identity from its shareholders.
But incorporation does not cut off personal liability at all
times and in all circumstances. 9 Courts frequently "pierce the
corporate veil" and hold the sole shareholder liable for both
contractual and tort liability of "his" corporation. Usually this
result has been reached by saying that the corporation has been
the alter ego, simulacrum, "normal identity," or "instrumentality"
of the sole shareholder.10 Of course, these terms are not self-
defining and become meaningful only when considered in the
light of the facts of the case in which they are employed. This
is simply a judicial technique employed to accomplish results
which would not logically flow from the popular dogma that
a corporation is an entity separate and distinct from its share-
holders.
6 Latty, A Conceptualistic Tangle and the One- or Two-Man Corporation,
34 N. Car. L. Rev. 471-480 (1956).
7 Lester Brothers, Inc. v. Pope Realty & Insurance Co., 250 N. C. 565, 109
S. E. 2d 263 (1959).
8 Elenkrieg v. Siebrecht, 238 N. Y. 254, 144 N. E. 519, 34 A. L. R. 592 (1924);
National Hotel Co. v. Motley, 123 S. W. 2d 461 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938);
Grapico Bottling Co. v. Ennis, 140 Miss. 502, 106 S. 97, 44 A. L. R. 124 (1925).
9 Ballantine, Corporations (rev. ed. 1946) § 122, pp. 292-293; Latty, The
Corporate Entity as a Solvent of Legal Problems, 34 Mich. L. Rev. 597
(1936).




Actually, it appears that the courts have been guided more
by what they consider to be legitimate uses of the corporate form,
the separate entity concept being set aside whenever asserted
for a purpose which the particular court considers inconsistent
with the policy of law for which the concept was developed."
Thus, the power to disregard the corporate entity appears to be
a discretionary or equitable power used to obtain a just result
according to the circumstances of the case and the conflicting
rights and liabilities of the parties.12
Factors Leading to Personal Liability
While the power to pierce the corporate veil is a sweeping
one, courts for the most part have exercised judicial restraint,
generally invoking the power only in cases of gross misuse of
the corporate form. The courts have placed special significance
on the manner in which the business was operated and the
amount of capital dedicated to the business.1
3
Manner in Which Business is Operated-Generally, it has
been held that mere failure to comply with statutory formalities,
such as holding directors' meetings and mailing notices, if not
detrimental to insiders or outsiders, will not subject the owner
to personal liability.14 However, the business must be maintained
and preserved as a separate entity. For example, personal and
business funds must not be commingled, 15 separate records must
be maintained, 16 contracts must not be made in the owner's own
name instead of corporation's,'1 7 or creditors told that the corpo-
ration is a mere name.' 8 If such practices are engaged in, the
11 Horowitz, Disregarding the Entity of Private Corporations, 14 Wash. L.
Rev. 285 (1939), 15 Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1940); Note, 34 N. Car. L. Rev. 432
(1956).
12 R.B. General Trucking, Inc. v. Auto Parts & Service, Inc., 3 Wis. 2d 91,
87 N. W. 2d 863 (1958).
13 See Note, One Man Corporations-Scope & Limitations, 100 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 853, 858 (1952); Cataldo, supra, n. 1, at 481.
14 Miller & Dabrin Furniture Company, Inc. v. :Camden Fire Insurance Co.,
55 N. J. Super. 205, 150 A. 2d 276 (1959).
15 1 Fletcher, Private Corporations, §§ 41, 44, 165 (perm. ed.); Minahan v.
Timm, 210 Wis., 689, 247 N. W. 321 (1932).
16 Larson v. Western Underwriters, Inc., 87 N. W. 2d 883 (S. D., 1958).
17 Biscayne Realty & Ins. Co. v. Ostend Realty Co., 109 Fla. 1, 148 S. 560
(1933); Shea v. Leonis, 14 Cal. 2d 666, 96 P. 2d 332 (1939).
18 Tynes v. Shore, 117 W. Va. 355, 185 S. E. 845 (1936); Rutz v. Obear, 15
Cal. App. 435, 115 P. 67 (1911).
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court is likely to disregard the corporate veil and hold the owner
personally liable.19
A good example of what is likely to happen when the corpo-
ration is not conducted as if it were a corporation is the case of
Dixie Mining & Manufacturing Company v. Williams.20  In
organizing the corporation, defendant did not bother to use
dummy incorporators, instead he merely "put down" two names
in addition to his own. No stock was ever issued to the two
fictitious incorporators, no meeting of stockholders or directors
was ever held, and the defendant operated the business as if
it was an individual proprietorship. In a suit by the widow of
one of the defendant's former employees, the court said that the
corporation was a mere sham, and held the owner personally
liable.
Adequate Capital-If an individual has risked an adequate
amount of money on the hazards of the business, and has not
attempted to shift the burdens of his doing business to others,
the separate corporate entity concept is likely to be applied, re-
gardless of the manner of operations.21 On the other hand, if
the capital of the corporation is illusory or trifling compared to
the business to be done and the risks of loss, or if the stock-
holder has withdrawn corporate assets, the corporate veil is likely
to be disregarded.
22
It is, of course, impossible to establish a standard amount
to be deemed adequate capital. The type of business, its locality
and its gross business are all relevant factors.
The currently popular "thin" corporation, where the capital
investment is kept modest and the working fund is supplemented
by a loan so as to enable tax saving, also creates problems. 23 If
a substantial amount of capital is risked at the inception, there
should be no objection to future financial aid which is not meant
to be included in capital. Arnold v. Phillips24 suggested that the
19 Failure to issue stock may be considered in determining whether the
corporate veil should be pierced. Wheeler v. Superior Mortgage Co., 17 Cal.
Rep. 291 (1961).
20 221 Ala. 331, 128 S. 799 (1930).
21 Note, Non-Tax Aspects of Thin Incorporation, 31 Vand. L. Rev. 751, 768
(1960).
22 Shafford v. Otto Sales Co., Inc., 149 Cal. App. 2d 428, 260 P. 2d 269 (1953);
Ballantine, Corporations § 129, pp. 302-303 (rev. ed. 1946).
23 Supra n. 21.




owner should be permitted to lend his corporation an amount
equivalent to the capital stock value. However, it is impossible
to make an arbitrary ruling. Each case should be decided on its
own merits.
The "inadequate capital" argument for piercing the corporate
veil is stronger in a tort action than in a contract action. There
are practical ways and means of determining the credit risk in
dealing with a particular corporation; and since the limited
liability of corporate stockholders is common knowledge in the
business world, the creditors know beforehand the limitations
they accept when they choose to do business with a one-man
corporation.
Despite the apparent fairness of the adequate capital test,
not all courts have adopted it. Some states have shown more
interest in the manner in which the business was operated. If
the operations conform to the test set out above, then the sole
owner is granted limited liability, the rationale being that limited
liability is granted by the corporation laws of the state, and if
there has been substantial compliance, then limited liability is
automatic. 25
Needless to say, persons with claims against the corporation
are interested more in the capital risked by the owner than in
the corporate formalities.
The states of New York and Idaho have specifically refused
to apply this test in tort actions against the sole shareholder for
unintentional torts of employees.
The leading New York case is Mull v. Ackerman, Colt Co.
Inc.2 6 Here the plaintiff sought to recover $500,000.00 damages
for the crushing of both his legs by a taxicab owned by a one-man
corporation. In New York it was common knowledge that the
owners of large fleets of taxicabs, for the purpose of limiting the
amount of possible recovery with respect to any accident, had
developed methods of continuing to operate large fleets of many
hundreds of taxicabs, while maintaining ownership of the taxi-
cabs in the names of many corporations. The plaintiff alleged
that it was fraud for the defendant to form a series of corpo-
rations, each owning only two cabs, in order to limit his liability.
The court refused to find such to be fraud, relying on the famous
25 Elenkrieg v. Siebrecht, supra, n. 8; Buckner v. Dillard, 184 Okla. 586,
89 P. 2d 326 (1939).
26 178 F. Supp. 720 (D. C. N. Y.), appeal dism. 279 F. 2d 25 (2nd Cir. 1959).
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Elenkrieg case27 for the proposition that a man may incorporate
his business for the very purpose of escaping liability.
The court went on to say that the rule would cause obvious
injustice in this case but that any relief would have to come
from the legislature, since it was perfectly clear that, under
New York law, where a corporation is legally created and does
in fact exist the sole owner is not personally liable. This argu-
ment has two weaknesses. First, the legislature did not create
the one-man corporation in New York, rather it was the judiciary
that recognized the device. Thus the court had a higher degree
of responsibility for the proper regulation of the one-man
corporation than did the legislature.28 Second, while the court
indicated that it was bound by precedent, it could very easily
have gotten around the Elenkreig case by limiting its holding to
its facts. For while the Elenkreig case has some very broad
statements that seem to repudiate the "adequate capital" theory,
the facts of the case indicate that there was adequate capital in
the case before the court.
The Idaho Supreme Court rejected the adequate capital test
in Hayhurst v. Boyd.29 Here plaintiff sought to recover for dam-
ages sustained while a patient in defendant's hospital. The hos-
pital corporation owned no property and had a capitalization of
only $360.00. The building, equipment and furnishings used to
operate the hospital were owned by another of defendant's
corporations. The court refused to disregard the corporate veil,
saying that there was no law which required the hospital to own
the property it used in its operations.
To be contrasted with the New York and Idaho cases are the
California cases which seem to have reached the opposite ex-
treme. In Mintan v. Cavaney,30 plaintiff's daughter drowned
in a pool which was the sole asset of X corporation. After being
unable to obtain satisfaction on a $10,000.00 judgment against the
27 Supra n. 8.
28 For other New York cases see: Petrovich v. Felco Chemical Corp., 194
Misc. 111, 86 N. Y. S. 2d 328 (1949); Werner v. Hearst, 177 N. Y. 63, 69
N. E. 221 (1903); Robinson v. Chase Maintenance Corp., 190 N. Y. S. 2d 733
(1958).
29 50 Idaho 752, 300 P. 895 (1931).
80 15 Cal. Rep. 641, 364 P. 2d 473 (1961); For other California cases see:
Temple v. Badya Bay Fisheries, Inc., 180 Cal. App. 2d 279, 4 Cal. Rep. 300
(1960); Automotriz Del Golfo De California v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792, 306




corporation, plaintiff brought this action to hold the attorney who
incorporated the two-man corporation personally liable on the
judgment. The attorney had been serving temporarily as
secretary-treasurer and director of the corporation. Apparently,
it is common practice for an attorney who is incorporating a one
or two-man corporation to temporarily serve as a dummy in-
corporator, director or officer.
Nevertheless, the court held that the attorney would be
personally liable as a director and officer if it was shown that
there was no attempt to provide adequate capitalization for the
corporation. However, since the defendant was not a party to
the original action against the corporation, plaintiff would have
to retry the case and make the defendant a party to the action.
A more reasonable application of the adequate capital test
appears in Sayers v. Navillus Oil Co.3 Here plaintiff's husband
was killed in an oil well explosion. The sole asset of the one-man
corporation for whom he worked was the oil well which was
also destroyed in the explosion. The well had been operated
successfully for about a year. The court, in refusing to hold the
sole stockholder personally liable, pointed out that the corpo-
ration had been founded with adequate capital.
Intentional Torts
There are few reported cases dealing with tortious intention-
al misconduct committed in the execution of the corporate busi-
ness by the sole stockholder. Logically, it would seem that the
courts should deny the privilege of limited liability when the
sole owner has himself committed the tort.32 The Academy
Award Products v. Bulova Watch CoY3 case sustained this po-
sition by holding that the corporate shield affords no protection
to the sole owner of a corporation who used the corporation to
injure the plaintiff by falsely procuring registration of a trade
mark for the purpose of harassing the plaintiff. 3 4
However, it is possible that some courts will, without dis-
tinction, apply the broad standard of limited liability to both
intentional torts by the owner and torts by employees of the
31 41 S. W. 2d 506 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
32 Cataldo, supra, n. 1, at 477.
33 129 F. Supp. 780 (S. D. N. Y 1955), aff'd 233 F. 2d 499 (1955).
34 Also see Jackson v. Kirschman, 175 S. 105 (La. App. 1937).
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corporation. The case of Wihtal v. Wells35 is troublesome in this
respect. While the holding of the case denied limited liability,
the court had difficulty in meeting the defendant's argument that
he did nothing outside of his official duty as an officer of the
corporation. The court apparently rested its decision on the fact
that the corporation was formed for the very purpose of infring-
ing the copyright in question.
If the intentional tort is one such as assault or false imprison-
ment, where there is clearly a right to sue the sole owner person-
ally, then disregarding the corporate veil is of less importance.
Here the injured party can reach the sole owner's shares of stock
in satisfaction of any judgment he may receive. This procedure




Some courts have had difficulty reaching equitable results
in one-man corporation tort cases. This is regrettable not only
from the standpoint of the injustice inflicted, but also because
such decisions might bring about a legislative rejection of a very
useful concept.
The reasons for recognizing one-man corporations far out-
weigh the disadvantages. First, the present plight of the small
businessman makes it desirable to reinforce his position in the
economy. And it can scarcely be doubted that the owners of
many small businesses have relied heavily on the possibility of
limiting losses by incorporating. Second, why should two or three
men be able to limit their liability and one man be denied that
privilege? Is there magic in numbers? As the court said in
Solomon v. Solomon & Co., Ltd.,37 "How does it concern the
creditors whether the capital of the company is owned by seven
persons . . . or almost entirely by one." Third, the denial of
limited liability to one-man corporations would discourage one
source of venture capital. Fourth, is it possible to prevent the
"brave and daring souls" from using dummies in order to in-
corporate? Such an attempt would probably result in allowing
the very people who are likely to cause trouble to use the
35 231 F. 2d 550 (7th Cir., 1956).
36 Geory v. Cain, 79 Utah 268, 9 P. 2d 396 (1932); Ernest v. Moore, 254
S. W. 2d 347 (Ky. App. 1953).
37 L. R. (1897) App. Cas. 22.
Jan., 1963
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corporate entity while the more reliable, high minded individuals
who would not resort to dummies would be denied the corpo-
rate form. Fifth, the courts of most states have recognized the
one-man corporation for over half a century. Literally thousands
of them exist across the country today. To attempt to abolish
these entities at this late date would bring on an avalanche of
problems.
Perhaps the only real argument against allowing one-man
corporations is their peculiar susceptibility to fraudulent use.
The opportunity for manipulation of assets, and the superior
knowledge of the sole shareholder, allow fraud and deviations
that are almost impossible to detect. But this disadvantage
simply does not outweigh the advantages. What is needed is
proper regulation. Courts should be ever aware of the peculiari-
ties of the one-man corporation and should not dogmatically
apply principles developed for large corporations to the one-man
corporation. Universal recognition of the "adequate capital"
theory would be a big step in this direction.
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